

The Dog that Hardly Barked: The Stances of Political Parties about European Integration in Western Europe, 2008-2013.

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Did political parties change their position about European integration since the onset of the economic crisis? This paper answers this question by comparing the programmatic stances of political parties in 2008 and 2013 on the basis of two expert surveys conducted by the authors. Theoretically, we test three models that theorize parties' potential responses to the economic malaise. First, a "left-shock" model argues that domestic re-distributional issues have become more linked parties' integration stances, especially for parties on the economic left. Second, a "right-shock" model suggests that social issues (over migration, national autonomy, and social order, for instance) become more closely tied to parties' integration stances, especially for parties on the center-right. Both models predict a significant strengthening of these factors as a basis of parties' EU stances, and a lowering of EU support. In contrast, a "status-quo" model maintains that parties change only incrementally in large part because of their domestic-competitive constraints restrict their movement on integration issues. We find that (1) extreme parties adopt even clearer anti-EU positions in 2013 than they did in 2008; (2) most mainstream parties changed hardly at all; (3) neither did the basis of their EU stances. The results point to the inflexibility of mainstream parties in responding to the programmatic challenges that the economic crisis poses for them. A clear political implication is that Euro-skeptic parties will perform strongly in the 2014 elections to the European parliament. A distinct theoretical implication is that parties do not adequately represent the preferences of citizens over European integration.

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Introduction

Have the programmatic stances of political parties changed as a result of the economic crisis in Europe?

The economic malaise dramatically highlights how closely intertwined nations have become.

International financial rescue packages impose severe austerity programs on crisis-ridden countries, while more affluent nations in Europe must provide the resources to cover the potential cost for these policies. Do these developments alter the nature and sources of party stances about European integration? Using two expert surveys covering most political parties in 14 West European countries—one conducted in early 2008 and another one in 2013—we begin to answer these questions.

Accordingly, we first describe the position of parties on European integration in 2008 and 2013, aiming to uncover any changes in their programmatic positions about European integration. Have parties become less positive about Europe's market and political integration as a result of the malaise? Are there differences in the way they evaluate market and political integration? How positive do parties remain about European integration and the way EU institutions work five years into the economic crisis? We describe the empirical patterns over time.

While a description of party stances is one goal of this paper, we also pursue a more theoretical objective: we examine by how much the sources of party stance about integration may have changed during the tumultuous years since 2008. This paper focuses on the party-level sources of their programmatic stances. To begin with, we expect that extreme "niche" parties oppose Europe's integration at both time points (Meguid 2005; 2008; de Vries and Edwards 2009). The Dutch PVV, British UKIP, Italian M5S, or Greek Golden Dawn no doubt continue to be Euro-skeptic parties as they opposed integration even when Europe's economies were in reasonably good shape (if a party existed at that time). But have they become even more Euro-skeptic? We will examine, in short, whether the differences between fringe and mainstream parties over Europe sharpened during the crisis years and

thus whether European voters will have even clearer options over Europe in the 2014 European parliamentary elections than they did in the last election to the European parliament in 2009.

An equally important question is whether the way that *mainstream* parties evaluate the EU has changed. Not just in terms of their overall position, though we clearly do want to know whether they adjusted their stance on European integration in light of the decline in public support for the European project (de Vries 2013; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013). In addition, we ask: are the party-level factors that underlie their support in 2008 comparable to those that underlie their EU stances in 2013? Given the fact that Europe's political elite increasingly recognizes the need for coordinated economic policy-making, and the economic hardship that result from austerity-driven bailout policies, has the relationship between parties' integration stances and their programs on *domestic* redistribution strengthened over time, especially for parties on the center-left? Similarly, given that nation-states may lose control over fiscal matters as a result of the way that bailout packages are designed, we ask: has the relationship between parties' integration stances and socially conservative issue position strengthened over time, especially for parties on the center-right?

To address these issues, we conducted two expert surveys about the stances of European political parties. Our first study measures the position of 114 West European parties in the spring of 2008, a few months before the economic crisis in Europe began to unfold.¹ We thus have a data set of party positions on a range of domestic and EU-related issues falling squarely at the beginning of it, perhaps even preceding it by a few months. At that time, policy-makers had not begun to discuss issues like sovereign debt, the banking crisis, bond purchases, and austerity programs in early 2008—terms that now all too familiar to many citizens.

While the results based on the 2008 survey show that political parties account for the diverse interests of mass publics across a range of issues—including European integration (Rohrschneider and

¹ This project also includes 13 CEE countries which we do not consider this paper for reasons of space.

Whitefield 2012)—we now examine whether the economic crisis affected the programmatic choices they offer to voters. For that reason, we are currently completing a second expert survey for Europe as a whole, this time covering 108 parties in the same 14 West European nations that we included in the earlier study.² We use an identical questionnaire in both surveys (more details below), covering 90 West European parties that existed at both time points. In addition, we added 18 new ones not considered in the previous round; and 24 parties vanished since 2008. This, in short, constitutes our two-wave panel of party positions in West Europe.

Our findings, in brief, show (1) extreme parties have become even more Euro-skeptic relative to other parties than they already were in 2008; (2) neither moderate left, centrist, nor center-right parties change their stances over integration much at all over the five year time period; (3) domestic economic and social issues have roughly the same influence on parties' EU stances at both time points. This stability (except for niche parties) is remarkable given the incentives for most mainstream parties to alter their position (see our discussion below), and the fact that issues of European integration tend to cross-cut domestic, political divisions (Kriesi et al. 2008).

The significance of our argument and findings are at least threefold. First, given the incentives for mainstream parties to become more critical (see below), we interpret the stability as a sign that other, non-programmatic factors strongly shape their position on integration, in particular, their domestic-strategic position in a party system along with their historical commitment to integration. Second, the high degree of programmatic stability agrees with the idea that parties only sporadically change their positions in significant ways (Baumgartner, Breunig, et al. 2009). Third, the stability we find raises the disconcerting question of how the changing views of mass publics over integration are articulated by parties. We know that European citizens have become more negative about integration after the economic crisis unfolded its full force. We therefore consider it of paramount importance to

² The Central-East European portion of the study will be completed shortly.

study how well political parties articulate the Euro-skeptic preferences of European publics (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Mattila and Raunio, 2012).

This paper is structured as follows. First, we will discuss how the nature of European integration has changed over time. Second, we discuss that the way the economic crisis unfolded provides mainstream parties with plenty of reasons to become more critical about the EU. The third section presents the results; and the conclusion develops the broader implications of the central findings.

The Changing Character of European Integration

The economic crisis has significantly re-defined the character of European integration. Increasingly, the EU and national governments focus on issues that affect the core of national resources and sovereignty: economic bailouts require the (potential)³ re-distribution of resources from wealthier countries to nations that need financial support. This issue constitutes a seismic shift in the character of European integration from what it once was. When integration efforts focused on the development of a common market, it was broadly carried by a lack of interest among mass publics, and was driven largely by support from political elites—a permissive consensus. After the 1993 Maastricht treaty, however, the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU became more salient, and more controversial, even though it was still supported by a “strained dissent” (Marks and Hooghe 2008). The greater dissent is one reason why recent analyses reveal that European issues increasingly influence the results of national elections (Hobolt, Spoon, et al. 2009).

However, even this fractured consensus does not adequately describe the current situation given the urgency of economic and political issues on the table. Since the start of the crisis in 2008, Europe’s problems and their potential solutions now center on the possibility of a redistribution of economic resources across national borders from wealthier nations to those in need. In other words,

³ “Potential” because many commitments were made in form of financial guarantees, not actual cash transfers.

integration *and* domestic redistribution policies become more closely connected as affluent nations must debate how to cover the potential costs for rescue policies. In addition, given that national governments, along with EU institutions, design financial rescues as they go along, these *political* decisions amount to the creation of new political rules (i.e., political elites decide how financial transfers become policies) which have the potential for massive political controversies, such as whether the European Central bank should subsidize national budgets by directly purchasing sovereign debt. In short, the current situation fuse complex and politically highly charged questions over the re-distribution of resources and national sovereignty into one complex issue bundle (Fabbrini 2013).

Given these development, we examine the programmatic stances on political and market integration principles in order to examine how committed they remain to the idea of European integration five years into the economic crisis. We also examine how parties evaluate the way the current EU “regime” works partly because “[p]ublic evaluations of democratic processes are increasingly important to the integration process” (Hobolt 2012, p. 100). Given the influence of parties on mass opinions about European integration (Gabel and Scheve 2007) we would like to know whether their programmatic stances about integration principles and their current practices changed during the tumultuous years since 2008.

Why Party Positions on European Integration May Have Changed—or Not

Against this backdrop, recent opinion surveys clearly document that most voters have become more skeptical about integration.⁴ Consequently, political parties of all stripes have incentives to increasingly oppose European integration over time. How did they respond, if at all, to these dynamics?

A first task in light of this question is to establish a baseline for our expectation about any changes that may have taken place over the five year time period. To this end, we note that a number of analyses established that the relationship between parties’ left-right ideology and European Integration

⁴ An excellent series of surveys documenting the decline in support for various aspects of European integration is published by the Pew research Center.

follows a curvilinear relationship in Western Europe: parties at the left and right polar end of the ideological distribution—variously called extreme or niche parties (Meguid 2005)—typically oppose European integration; parties in the center-left and center-right usually support it (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). The extreme left is unhappy with the (social) market aspects of Europe’s integration; and the extreme right opposes the loss of national sovereignty, the opening of borders, and the reduction in national identity (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Schmitt and Thomassen 2009). In other words, opposition to the EU is mainly economically driven on the very left; and mostly based on considerations about national autonomy, migration, and social issues on the very right. The moderate left, in contrast, has often supported European integration because it endorses the idea of a social market economy; and the center-right presumably endorses it because a common market promises a competitive environment. For this reason, the relationship between parties’ general ideology and support for integration follows a curvilinear relationship in Western Europe. Our base-line expectation for 2008, therefore, is expressed by the uncontroversial hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: In 2008, the extreme left and right of party systems oppose integration; centrist parties support European integration.

Three Models Capture the Potential Responses of Parties to the Crisis. Against this baseline expectation, how may the economic turmoil have affected the position of parties? Three models predict different outcomes.

First, a *left-shock* model focuses on the economic consequences of the crisis and subsequent bailouts. The focus on austerity measures that minimally cushion the economic blow for ordinary citizens means that the moderate left now has ample reasons to become more critical about integration since 2008. Unemployment rates in Greece, Spain, and Portugal are very high, especially among the younger generations. Parties on the left in more affluent nations, in turn, may be worried about the drastic economic consequences of rescue packages for its own voters who tend to be skeptical about

the massive bailouts that may lead to cut-backs in domestic programs if crisis countries fail to pay back loans to various international organizations. Marks and Hooghe (2006) and de Vries and Edwards (2009) have pointed out that economic motives prompt parties to reject integration. But given the current context, this mechanism may increasingly apply to moderate left parties as well. In short, the logic of the left-shock model predicts that moderate left parties have become more skeptical about European integration since 2008. What is more, by 2013, their stances on domestic welfare issues should be more strongly linked to their positions on European integration than in 2008:

Hypothesis 2 (left-shock): Since 2008, extreme and moderate left parties have become more skeptical about European integration and the way the EU has handled the crisis.

A right-shock model, in turn, captures the reasons why right-wing parties likely became more skeptical about the EU. First, while these parties generally endorse the austerity-based policies, they may actually reject the *political* implications of the way the rescue packages came about, in a twofold way. First, the EU is designing political institutions in an ad hoc fashion by way of its decision-making over the years. The implications of multiple top-level meetings clearly mean that policy-makers now coordinate their budgetary and fiscal policies in ways that may lead to a loss of national sovereignty over financial matters. This development may increase opposition on the right because “any questions concerning the *constitutions* of Europe are likely to fall most firmly within the national arena” (Mair 2000, p. 45). What is more, the right may actually oppose some of the policy-making instruments, such as the capacity of the European Central Bank to buy sovereign debt which if made permanent would also reduce countries’ national autonomy. In addition, European integration means that countries accept the free movement of people; an issue that connects easily with the anti-immigrant sentiments that can lead to opposition to integration among voters (McLaren 2002; 2004) and parties on the right-extreme like the UK’s Independence Party (Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2013; Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes 2012). The

current context appears ripe for parties to connect opposition to integration to their conservative stances on social issues, especially in 2013:

Hypothesis 3 (right-shock): Since 2008, extreme and moderate right parties have become more negative about European integration and the way the EU has handled the crisis.

Taken together, hypothesis 2 and 3 reflect the argument that the link between parties' general ideology and their integration stances follows a curvilinear relationship. The extremes are opposed to integration; the mainstream is more supportive of it. But we also argue that support for integration among mainstream parties has been lowered since the onset of the crisis. What is more, the hypotheses also stipulate that the link between domestic and integration stances have strengthened.

A key assumption in the left- and right-shock models is, however, that parties actually have the strategic freedom to move away from a pro-Europe stance. But domestic-competitive considerations actually may limit the programmatic flexibility that hypotheses 2 and 3 imply. In the end, parties are partly captives of their domestic, programmatic commitments as well as the strategic context within which they compete for voters (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge, Farlie et al 1987). They may thus have less flexibility in responding to the EU crisis than the left and right-shock models suggest.

Consider a mainstream left party that struggles to justify the austerity-based bailouts. While its programmatic commitment to a more "social Europe" may incentivize it to become critical about the EU, it may incur a hefty penalty for such moves, for two reasons. First, for most parts, mainstream labor parties have historically supported the formation of a unified Europe (Ladrech 2002). Clearly, there is variation within the left-of-center camp over integration as when British and Swedish Labor parties are less enthusiastically support European integration than, say, the French socialists and German Social Democrats. Despite some variation in the left-of-center camp, however, their growing support for Europe over time means that they are reputationally locked in a general pro-Europe position. What is more, even if social democrats become more critical about European integration, it is not clear that it

stands to gain electorally from a Europe-critical position. Instead, it may entail that Socialist parties (like the Dutch SP and Die Linke in Germany) may benefit from critiquing the European Union policies. For if mainstream party competitors like Social Democrats direct attention to the downsides of the current bailouts, smaller niche parties may actually be more credible to address voters' dissatisfaction with the EU, not mainstream social democrats. The center-right faces a similar dilemma, particularly over social issues. If it adopts a Euro-skeptic tone in public debates, voters may increasingly see the extreme right, or new Euro-skeptic parties (like the Alliance for Germany or the True Finns) as the most plausible Euro-skeptic party that best address issues of migration, national autonomy, and social order (Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2013; de Vries and Edwards 2009). Thus, a *status-quo* model predicts that we observe fairly limited movement of mainstream parties against Europe.

Hypothesis 4 (status quo): The programmatic positions of mainstream parties over integration change little over time.

Summary. The economic crisis presents parties at the left and the right with strong incentives to move against integration; and strategic-competitive factors along with programmatic legacies provide mainstream parties with incentives to stay broadly where they were in 2008. Theory does not provide us with good reasons to favor either the shock or status quo models so the crucial task in the empirical section will be to determine which one describes reality appropriately.

Data

We conducted two expert surveys in 27 European nations, one in 2008; a second one in 2013. We included all EU-member-states as of January 1, 2013 (except Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta); along with three non-EU countries (Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine). The current paper focuses on parties in 14 West European countries where we surveyed the stances of 114 parties in 2008; in 2013 the WE universe covered 108 parties. Given the significant number of small parties that exist in many party

systems, we used two criteria to determine whether to include a party in a survey: (1) they are represented in a national parliament; (2) and they received at least 2% of the national vote in the last election. This yardstick assures us that we include all significant legislative parties. It also means that we excluded a handful of very small parties, despite their parliamentary representation. For example, we excluded several small regional parties in the UK and Spain on the basis of these criteria. We did so to keep the survey from growing even longer than it already is as experts had to answer nearly all questions for each party. Finally, in a few instances, a pilot study⁵ which we conducted with one expert for every country revealed that a party received very strong support in opinion surveys before a pending national election even though that party did not meet the two criteria. In that case, like Verdonk in the Netherlands in 2008, a party was still included. However, the vast majority of parties are included on the basis of the simple fact that they meet the first and second criterion. All in all, 90 parties exist at both time points; 24 parties included in the 2008 survey had to be excluded by 2013 on the basis of these criteria; and we added 18 parties for inclusion in the 2013 study.

The experts were recruited on the basis of a master list we assembled on the basis of whether experts had published a peer-reviewed article or book on her party system in the past ten years in English. This generated a list of names with over 500 experts. We supplemented this list with recommendations from our contacts (if a name was not already included in the master list). This procedure assures us that we include respondents who feel comfortable with the long questionnaire. We aimed to have ten completed questionnaires for every country. Although there is no absolute minimum an expert survey ought to achieve, Huber and Inglehart (1995) recommend a minimum number of five experts; a conclusion that was more recently supported by Gabel and Huber (2000).

⁵ The pilot phase consisted of two parts. First, we asked a trusted expert to complete the questionnaire. Second, we asked each expert to evaluate the meaning of questions in the context of their party system; and to evaluate whether we excluded relevant parties; or included too many. In some party systems, this decision turned out to be quite involved because of the high degree of organizational volatility of parties, such as Moldova, some Baltic states, Italy, and Spain. Although the final decision rested with us, it is worth noting that we reached a consensus with each expert.

Happily, we exceeded this minimum in every country; and often came close to meeting our goal of ten respondents. Extensive analyses with the 2008 data show that our surveys produce empirical patterns that closely match those generated by other data sources.⁶

Results: Describing Party Stances on European Integration

What are the stances that political parties take on European integration, and have these changed since the full force of the economic crisis unfolded in the years after 2009? We asked our experts at both time points to indicate the programmatic position that parties communicate to voters on various integration aspects, including where parties stand on political and market integration. On political integration, we asked:

“How about the EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do parties stand on creating a politically unified Europe? Do they strongly support a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 7) or do they strongly oppose a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 1) or something in between?”

This question clearly puts political unity of Europe into the center of expert attention. It does not ask for the specific forms of political integration; instead it asks where parties principally stand on the desirability of forming a Europe-wide polity. A second question taps party programs on economic integration:

“Where do the parties in [country] stand on creating a Europe-wide, integrated market for the European Union?”

This indicator gauges how parties view the development of a common, Europe-wide market.

Importantly, these indicators allow us to examine nuanced variation across parties and integration

⁶ For example, there is a high correlation between the ideological placement of parties in our 2008 survey and that in other expert surveys, such as Benoit/Laver and the Chapel Hill group (see Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012, chapter 1). We will do the same for the 2013 data once it is completed.

forms as not all parties support both goals to the same degree (see below). For example, political integration is more controversial than market integration in the UK, so our measures aim to capture this diversity. Has the “permissive” consensus over market integration withstood the test of difficult economic times since 2008? Do we see the “constrained” dissent over political integration to a greater degree in 2013 (Hooghe and Marks 2008)?

A third measure gauges parties’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the EU regime:

- “And what about the party’s view of how well democracy works in the EU?”

In contrast to the political and market stances, this measure stresses the operating procedures of the EU framework.⁷ At the EU level, the indicator focuses broadly on the actual operation of the regime so that is likely captures the overall performance of the EU framework, including its role during the financial crisis (Fabbrini 2013).

Figure 1 shows the general inter-relationships between the three integration indicators in 2008 and 2013 two surveys. To start with market and political integration, they are reasonably strongly linked ($r=.76$ in 2008 and $r=.77$ in 2013) which means that parties that support market integration tend to support political integration as well. At the same time, we note that about half of the variance between the indicators is not shared which reflects the fact that some parties favor market integration without supporting political integration. For example, parties in the UK are fairly strongly in favor of market integration but oppose political integration (see the evidence below), as do some parties in Sweden.

Figure 1 about here

When we turn our attention to the performance indicator we see that the way parties evaluate the performance of the EU is related to their general integration stances at both time points. For example, market integration and the EU’s performance evaluations are strongly linked ($r=.82$ and $r=.80$ in 2008

⁷ The sources of national regime evaluations, which we also asked about, are the subject for another paper. For example, initial analyses show that incumbents are a bit more positive about national regimes than opposition parties, just as at the level of mass publics and individual politicians (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006).

and 2013, respectively). We see a weakening of the linkage (though still substantial overall) between the performance indicator and political integration from 2008 ($r=.82$) to 2013 ($r=.72$), perhaps because parties and their constituents begin to think about political integration and the EU's performance in more nuanced ways as a result of the recent turmoil.

This overall stability does not mean, however, that there is no change at all; only that change in the pooled data did not appear at each time point. Do we observe the same stability for parties that existed at both time points? To address this issue, Figure 2 plots on the y-axis the party scores for 2013; and on the x-axis the 2008 scores. If parties fall exactly on the 45 degree line, they have not changed their position at all. Parties above the line are more positive in 2013 than in 2008; those below the line have become more negative about the EU. We again see considerable stability in party positions across the two time points. But there is also a bit of variation around the "exact match" line, especially among parties that were previously positive. Among them are a number of center-right parties (like the German CDU and Dutch VVD) but also center-left parties (Spanish PSOE and British Labor). Even among the group of staunch opponents we see a movement towards stronger opposition, among them again the Dutch PVV and French FN and Italian LN. On the whole, however, the vast majority of cases change by less than 1 unit across time, including political integration (82 percent by 2013 remain within one unit of where they were in 2008), market integration (88 percent) and evaluations of the EU regime (88 percent). This bird's eye view, in short, shows that there a fairly high degree of relative and absolute stability in party positions over European integration across a range of starting positions.

Figure 2 about here

These party-level patterns, however, may mask politically important variation across countries.

Therefore, Figure 3a displays the absolute mean scores of all parties included in a survey at a given time point for each country; Figure 3b simply calculates the change scores for each party system to precise the degree of change (so both figures should be read in tandem). We used the unweighted scores so

that every party receives equal weight in this calculation; below we will take into account various traits of parties, including their electoral success. A downward slope in Figure 3a indicates that the mean scores for the totality of parties reflect greater opposition to the EU by 2013. A negative score in Figure 3b indicates a party system has become more opposed to an integration aspect by 2013.

Figure 3 about here

Starting with political and market integration, we see that the aggregate pattern of stability actually masks some cross-national variation in the fluidity of national averages. In some countries (notably France and, to a lesser degree, in Portugal and Spain) we observe an increase in support for European integration for all three aspects. The rise in France is remarkable as it moves the French party systems from an ambiguous “4” in 2008 (on the seven point indicator) to 5 which denotes support on our indicator. What is more, the increase occurs across all three aspects, not just one or the other (as in some other countries). Whether this is related to the election of a socialist president across the two expert waves, is one possibility. However, we do note here that while the government changes from a center-right to a center left in France between the two surveys, the opposite occurred in Portugal and Spain so that there is no “obvious” connection between the ideological leaning of current governments to the overall integration stances of parties.

In contrast to the French, Portuguese, and Spanish countries, however, we observe a noticeable decline in support for integration aspects in most other countries. We see the most perceptible decrease in integration support in the UK where European integration has become even more controversial than it historically has been the case, and certainly was in 2008 (when we conducted our first expert survey). But other countries also evidence a decline, including Germany (where growing skepticism over integration nearly propelled a new Euro-skeptic party into the federal parliament in the

2013 election),⁸ Greece, Ireland but partially also Belgium and Denmark. A third and final group of countries shows a mixed assessment, displaying a roughly flat line indicating little change which includes Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

Turning our attention to the indicators that measure party stances on the performance of the EU and national regime, we observe an even greater range of responses. On the EU regime indicator (the solid line in figure 3a), we first observe that several countries see a decline in positive evaluations. This include Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Spain. In other countries, we see a flat line (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and the UK) mostly because these party systems were rather negative about the EU in 2008 so that little further decline was possible. Finally, evaluations in France and Sweden increased noticeably. In short, we again see a broad range of party system responses that are not easily reconciled with the way that the economic malaise played out in various nations.

Summary. All in all, we see a broad range of patterns both across time, space, and parties. The central conclusion we draw from these descriptions is that *there does not appear to be a single “obvious” explanation for these patterns*. While party systems in crisis-plagued countries like Ireland and Greece have become more negative, suggesting that the austerity measures drive this reaction, we also see a decline in Germany, a country not particularly hard hit by the economic crisis. We also see a slight increase in support over integration principles in nations which had to struggle mightily economically (Portugal and Spain) so this too undermines a simple causal account that would lead us to favor one broad macro factor as the premier driver of stability and change. Any assessment of how political parties respond to such economic malaise, therefore, must search for theoretical explanations that go beneath the surface of these obvious candidates. We turn to these issues in the next section where we consider a number of party-level predictors of their EU stances that capture the “right-shock” and “left-shock” factors.

⁸ The new Allianz für Deutschland received 4.7 percent of the popular vote, which falls just a fraction short to pass the required 5 percent threshold.

Explaining Party Stances on EU Stances: Multivariate Analyses

We include the following variables in the empirical models:

Measurement. Turning our attention first to the domestic redistribution measure, we used three indicators to measure party stances about domestic, re-distributional issues (the “left-shock” indicator). We prefer to use issue-specific indicators, rather than a broader left-right placement indicator, because we assume that the reasons for opposition to the EU can differ across the party spectrum (Marks and Hooghe 2006; de Vries and Edwards 2009). Specifically, we assume that left parties mainly object to the EU on economic issues (both the extreme and moderate left); whereas the right bases its opposition to the EU mainly on the socio-cultural issues.⁹ First, we asked:

“What position do parties take on social inequality in [country]? Does the party take the position that social inequality is unjustified and undesirable (in which case it would score 1) or that it is justified (because of incentives, justice etc.) and desirable (in which case it would score 7) or something in between?”

A second measure focuses on welfare services:

“Now thinking about specific welfare and labour market measures, what stances do parties take on the following provisions? Do they strongly support (score 7) or strongly oppose (score 1) or something in between?” Respondents then evaluated whether parties favor “universal welfare benefits” or “means-tested welfare benefits”.

The three indicators are highly correlated in 2008 and 2013 ($\alpha=.90$ in both years) so that we constructed one additive index measuring party stances on domestic redistribution. Since divisions over domestic redistributions constitute the most important cleavage in every West European party systems

⁹ We conducted all analyses with a left-right placement indicator where experts located a party on a seven point left (1) right(7) indicator. The empirical patterns and conclusions are virtually identical to those based on the issue-based indicators. Our strategy has the advantage that we can see the issue content of the left-right divide which is not possible with the placement indicator.

at both time points, this indicator measures party stances on an important political division.¹⁰ The indicator ranges from 3 (indicating strong support for re-distributive policies) to 14 (strong support for markets). It is highly correlated with the general left-right placement of parties by experts ($r=.85$ in 2008; $r=.88$ in 2013).

In order to measure the “right-shock” model, we use party positions on social issues (defined as abortion, equal opportunities, gender equality), the promotion of civil liberties, and migration to and from a country (see the appendix for the exact question wording).¹¹ These three items are highly correlated ($\alpha=.92$ in 2008 and 2013) so we again constructed an additive indicator that ranges from 3 (indicating support for social issues positions) to 21 (opposition to social issue positions). This indicator, too, is strongly related to the general left-right indicator ($r=.79$ in 2008; $r=.77$ in 2013).

Moving to the niche party indicator, we coded all parties belonging to the communist, Socialist, Greens, centrist, centrist/liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives, nationalists, and “others” (e.g., Klingemann et al. 2006). We used a variety of sources to determine the nature of parties, including information from parties’ websites, consultations with experts, and the party manifesto data set.¹²

The electoral success of parties is gauged with two variables. First, we include the electoral support that parties received in the last election prior to the expert survey. Second, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a party is a member of a country’s government. We would expect governing parties to be more supportive, on average, of the EU since they design the bailout packages and, moreover, governing parties have often been the most outspoken supporters of European integration.

¹⁰ We ascertained the importance of various political divisions for party systems as a whole through a question that asks experts to rank the importance of several potential divisions, including redistribution, but also regional, religious, and international divisions.

¹¹ One potential problem with this indicator is that it measures not only party stances on migration to a country but also from it. However, while it is conceivable that parties support one and oppose the other, practically this is not the case. What is more, those parties we expect to resist migration are indeed most opposed to it such as the PVV in the Netherlands, the National Front in France, the VB in Belgium, the Austrian FPÖ and BZÖ, and the Greek Golden Dawn.

¹² Others includes a smattering of parties whose character is unclear, such as the Italian Five Star movement.

As a control variable, we include one indicator of the salience of EU stances because parties that are more concerned with the way that the economic crisis has unfolded may be more negative about the EU. After experts indicated whether parties favor a Europe-wide polity, we asked:

“And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide government (regardless of the specific form) in how a party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all.”

Our measurement strategy provides experts with the opportunity to assess party positions and salience on issues independently. The salience measures range from 1, indicating that an issue is entirely unimportant, to 7 indicating that an issue is very important to a party. We also asked them to assess the importance of market integration to political parties, again after they provided information about party positions on market integration. Both salience indicators are correlated fairly strongly, though they are not identical, suggesting that parties tend to distinguish between these integration aspects in their communication with voters¹³.

Another control variable measures whether a party is new in 2013, or was included in 2008 but not in 2013. Recall that our criteria for the inclusion of parties were to consider all *relevant* parties which we defined as (1) them having parliamentary representation at the time of the surveys and, furthermore, (2) having received at least 2 percent electoral support in the last national election before our survey. These yardsticks entail that some parties that existed in 2008 and 2013 were excluded at both time points (because they were not sufficiently significant). It also means that we included a handful of parties in 2008 but excluded them in 2013 (and vice versa) even though they existed at both time points. For example, we had a lengthy debate with a few Spanish experts about which of the fairly large number of regionalist parties in Catalonia ought to be included in our study. For practical reasons, we excluded several separatist parties that failed to pass our two criteria for inclusion in 2013 even

¹³ Pearson's $r=.64$ in 2008 and $r=.70$ in 2013, indicating that about half of indicator variance is shared.

though they existed, such as the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). We had similarly involved discussions during the pilot study with experts from Belgium, France, Greece, Lithuania, , Italy, Moldova, and Romania. In the end, we aimed to balance covering all significant parties all the while keeping the questionnaire at a manageable length. This entails is that our dichotomous measure of “stable” parties should be read as “significant and stable” parties. The dummy variable “stable parties” means that “exit” parties constitute the reference group for 2008; and “new” parties are the reference group in 2013. The “stability” coefficients in tables 1 and 2 thus indicate whether significant and stable parties adopt stances that are different from parties included in one survey only.

Results. We began the analyses by estimating an empty random intercept model where time represents level 1, party denotes level 2, and country signifies level 3. This analysis estimates how much variation in the 2-wave panel is due to variation across time versus variation across parties versus variation across countries (Snijders and Bosker 2012; Bartels 2008). Based on the descriptive analyses presented earlier, we expect that most of the variance is located at the party and country-level.

And that is what the variances at each level show. At level 1, which captures the extent to which parties change over time, we see by far the lowest amount of variances. The other two levels (level 2 capturing variation across parties) and level 3 (variation across countries) share the bulk of the variances. Let us illustrate this via one example. The total amount of variance for political integration is $\text{var}=2.42$; of which $\text{var}=2.2$ is located at the higher levels. In more technical terms, this Intra-Class-Coefficient ($\text{ICC}=.91$) captures the fact that 9 percent of variation is due to changes over time within parties; about 91 percent is due to variation across parties (and countries). In substantive terms, this finding already supports a central conclusion of this paper—that parties only minimally changed their positions on integration over time.

Table 1 about here

For our analyses, this high degree of temporal stability, coupled with the small number of countries we have in our study (N=14), entails that we focus first on the influence of party-level traits on their integration stances at each year. We also include in the model country-fixed effects. Table 2 presents the results, showing the direct effects of each predictor variable on party stances about political integration in 2008 and 2013 (columns 1 and 2), market integration (columns 3 and 4), as well as their evaluations of how well the EU regime works (columns 5 and 6).

Table 2 about here

We see, first, that extreme niche parties (communists and nationalists) have become much more negative about the EU relative to other parties. This is clearly noticeable for the political integration indicator where the coefficient decreases from $b = -.72$ to a whopping $b = -1.69$. This means that extreme parties are now nearly 2 points more negative about political integration than other parties! This is a dramatic change over time on a seven point scale, especially considering that we include squared indicators for economic and cultural positions that pick up some of the extreme-mainstream variation. This pattern clearly points to the growing polarization over European integration between extreme and other parties beyond domestic issues. The growth in extreme-party opposition is slightly less for market integration (from $b = -.53$ in 2008 to -1.43 in 2013) but here, too, we note a significant widening of the rift between mainstream and extreme parties, as over the evaluations of the performance of the EU. Note also that these are conservative estimates as we also include a new party indicator (sometimes encompassing niche parties); when this indicator is excluded, for example, the extreme party dummy increases to $b = 1.71$ for political integration in 2013). All in all, the growth of niche-mainstream gap over integration not only confirms that the extremes are less positive about the EU than non-extremists (as hypothesis 1 suggests), but that this pattern has dramatically sharpened during the five year period independently of domestic, re-distributional and cultural issues.

Did the mainstream parties respond to these challenges from the right and the left? The general answer is a resounding “No”! First, though, note that the squared term of the re-distribution indicator is highly significant for all integration aspects. This is consistent with prior arguments suggesting that parties that favor centrist market stances support political and economic integration more strongly than parties that oppose them (Ladrech 2002). Figure 4 visualizes the increase in support of integration as one moves across the economic left-right scale. Note that most parties fall within a range of about 7 and 14 on the x-axis at both time points (this range roughly coincides with the location of one standard deviation above and below the means on political integration in 2008 and 2013). This means that for all practical purposes, there is a nearly linear increase in EU support, and favorable EU evaluations, as one moves from the economic mainstream on the left to the economic mainstream on the right. Crucially, this pattern does not change by much at all between 2008 and 2013 both in terms of the shape of the relationship and the location on the y-axis—the left-shock model does not receive any support as the influence of re-distributional positions remains virtually identical over time.

When we turn our attention to the cultural indicators, we observe a nearly linear drop in EU support as one moves from the socio-cultural left to the socio-cultural right, especially within the range of 2 standard deviations above and below the mean (from about 6 to 15 at both time points). Thus, the mainstream right which is fearful of the loss of national autonomy, migration, and other culturally liberal issues that may be championed by the EU is less likely to support various integration aspects. Importantly, we again note that there is barely any change across time in the empirical patterns which clearly rejects the argument that parties on the mainstream right have become more critical about the EU over time as a result of the way that the crisis unfolded since 2008. In short, there is little support for the right-shock model.¹⁴

¹⁴ Consequently, when we combine both indicators into one issue-based left-right indicator, we observe the expected curvilinear relationship as one moves from the extreme left to the extreme right (data not shown).

Finally, we note that larger, governing parties support the EU, whereas smaller, opposition parties tend to be more opposed to it. This is a non-controversial finding in light of the fact that larger parties, especially when in government, constitute the core support for European integration. We do note a subtle change over time, however: in 2008, being a larger party sufficed to be more positive about the EU. By 2013, however, the size requirement has become more limited: only governing parties are more supportive. Of course, when one or the other variable is excluded from the analyses, the remaining one becomes highly significant (because governing parties are also larger parties), so we do not want to make too much of this subtle change over time. Larger, established parties are still the champions of European integration.

Estimating the Effect of National Economic Problems on EU stances. In a final step, we relaxed the “fixed effects” for countries to estimate the direct impact of the economic malaise at each time point. We do so because the logic of the left and right-shock models suggests the possibility that the economic malaise may increase the relevance of distributional and social issues mainly in countries that have experienced massive unemployment and a lowering of living standards, along with a clear loss of national autonomy. In short, economic conditions may mediate the influence of degree to which economic and social issues form the foundation for conflicts over integration. Against this expectation, however, is the possibility that parties in more affluent countries are *also* put into an ambivalent situation as when center-right parties may oppose the potential loss of national autonomy; and the center-left may not endorse the prospect of subsidizing people in difficult economic situations in other nations. In this case, the different economic conditions lead to the expectation that economic conditions do not matter.

To test whether the influence of economic and cultural issues on integration stances depends on the degree of economic “misery”, we constructed an index which combines national levels of unemployment rates and GDP per capita into one index. We used the information from the year prior to

our survey and added it to the expert surveys because this lagged information is more likely to inform public debates than information from the same time period. We first standardized each variable, then reversed the GDP/cap variable so that low values on the misery index indicate “low misery” (i.e., low levels of unemployment and high GDP/capita); and high “misery values” indicate high unemployment rates and low GDP/capita rates.¹⁵

We then estimated two sets of multi-level models with each dependent variable. A first one adds the misery index to each model in table 2 so that the misery coefficients capture the direct influence of economic conditions on each integration variable. We again estimated a multi-level model for each time point separately. Rather than displaying a large number of coefficients in another table that virtually replicates those in table 2, we note here that the misery index is always positive and statistically significant, with the exception of the 2013 coefficient predicting parties’ regime evaluations. The visual display of predicted integration stances by economic conditions (figure 5) reveals an interesting pattern that coefficients alone would not show (figure 5). We see for instance, that party support for political unity is much higher in 2008 in economically troubled countries¹⁶ than in 2013 (slightly below 5, almost moving near the territory of ambivalence). We see a similar drop for EU’s performance evaluations—they dropped mainly in nations with troubled economies. In contrast, party evaluations in more affluent nations have been fairly low all the way along. In short, as far as the direct effect of the economic malaise is concerned, it contributed to lowering the support for the EU in troubled countries, though not in more affluent countries.

¹⁵ We also considered including inflation rates but initial analyses show that they do not matter. What is more, given the economic concerns, low inflation rates may actually indicate a serious economic downturn given the concerns over deflationary pressures in some countries during this crisis. Inflation rates can thus be a misleading measure of how a country experiences the economic downturn.

¹⁶ The predicted value is slightly above 6 when misery is high in 2008 which indicates clear support for political integration.

Finally, we report that the influence of economic and cultural issues does not depend one bit on national misery—all interaction effects fail to reach statistical significance by a large margin.¹⁷ Thus, distributional issues have a similar influence on party stances in nations where the economy is doing fairly well and in countries where economic circumstances are difficult. Of course, the strengthening of niche party effect we observed above means that these interpretations must focus on the mainstream parties (because extreme parties did become more negative about the EU over time).

Conclusion

To recap, the four key findings of the paper are:

- Extreme left and right-wing parties are distinctly more anti-Europe than they already were in 2008;
- Integration stances of mainstream parties are stable over time;
- The economic and social issue base of parties remains unchanged;
- Parties in troubled economies have lowered their previously strong support for the EU to a more skeptical stance, approximating those of parties in more affluent nations.

In many ways, these patterns echo Peter Mair's (2000) conclusion that Europe matters indirectly for domestic competition among parties. However, one important modification to this dictum is, first, that the conflict between extreme and mainstream parties has sharpened since the onset of the economic crisis. In fact, in some cases, there exist grounds for concerns that the so-called fringe parties actually become so strong that they begin to rival mainstream parties, at least in European elections. For example, the UK Independence parties may become even stronger than it was in the last European parliamentary election when it received 16.5% of the vote. What is more, the Dutch PVV and French FN currently poll strongly so that there are good reasons to expect them to perform well during the 2014 European election. If that is the case, it would no longer be accurate to view the conflict over integration

¹⁷ We also inspected all conditional effects visually (to check whether there are changes at specific segments of the economic and cultural indicators—but that is not the case either).

pitting the “mainstream” against the “fringe”—at the EU level, the fringe may become part of the mainstream.

Another broader implication—one that we did not set our eyes on at the outset of this study—is that we should move beyond general left-right terms when describing the party positions in relation to domestic political conflicts. We find that the economic right is strongly supportive of political and market integration, whereas the economic left within the mainstream is quite skeptical about it. In contrast, the socially conservative right opposes integration, whereas the cultural left supports it. This means that support and opposition regarding the EU systematically varies within the left and the right—both extremist as well as mainstream parties, thus extending an argument developed by others from the extremes to the mainstream (Marks and Hooghe, 2006; de Vries and Edwards 2009). Our findings point to the continuing tensions that exist within the mainstream left and right over integration on the basis of economic and social issues. Surprisingly, this has not changed one bit with the economic crisis; if anything, the economic crisis has reinforced the tensions within the mainstream left and right.

So, why have parties not moved more in response to the programmatic incentives and the decline in public support for integration? A key reason may actually be found in the strong connection between specific issues and integration stances. For this points to the fact that parties have developed programmatic reputations on Europe that reflect their domestic origins. Consequently, dramatic shifts in stances may be more limited than is commonly assumed for integration stances. For example, mainstream left parties, like Social Democrats, must fear that a Euro-skeptical stance will not favor them but actually push Euro-skeptic voters to the more left-leaning camp that like the German Linke or the Dutch SP has been critical about integration for some time. In turn, the mainstream right may fear the same—making Euro-skepticism more salient may entail that Euro-skeptic parties become the main beneficiary of such a strategy. Thus, one factor limiting the flexibility of mainstream parties is their domestic, strategic context—something that future research must pay attention to.

All told, on one hand, our study may point to the resilience of mainstream parties to deal with difficult policy issues, and to provide steady and stable stewardship during a time of crisis. On the other hand, our study may also point to their anachronistic nature and inflexibility to tackle a new set of Europe-wide design issues that arise because nation-states no longer control their domestic agendas. Only time and future research will tell whether the rosy or gloomy interpretation gets it right.

Appendix

The following lists the indicators used in this study.

EU Integration Indicators--Position:

- Political integration: "How about the EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do parties stand on creating a politically unified Europe? Do they strongly support a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 7) or do they strongly oppose a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 1) or something in between?"

Market Integration.

- "Where do the parties in [country] stand on creating a Europe-wide, integrated market for the European Union?"

EU Regime Evaluations:

- "And what about the party's view of how well democracy works in the EU?"

Saliience:

- "And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide government (regardless of the specific form) in how a party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all."

Economic left-right index:

- "What position do parties take on social inequality in [country]? Does the party take the position that social inequality is unjustified and undesirable (in which case it would score 1) or that it is justified (because of incentives, justice etc.) and desirable (in which case it would score 7) or something in between?"

A second measure focuses on welfare services:

- "Now thinking about specific welfare and labour market measures, what stances do parties take on the following provisions? Do they strongly support (score 7) or strongly oppose (score 1) or something in between?" Respondents then evaluated whether parties favor "universal welfare benefits" or "means-tested welfare benefits".

A third measure indicates party positions on domestic re-distributional stances:

- "We would like to ask you next about the main parties' positions on the issues you just identified. Please note that we are interested in the official position of the party as represented by the main party leaders. (We ask you later to assess the extent to which a political party is internally divided on its policy stances.) Beginning with issue 1, could you now situate parties in COUNTRY? Please use a seven-point scale to score the position of a party. A score of 7 indicates

the most strongly liberal position and a score of 1 indicates the least liberal position on any particular issue. If a party has no stance on a given issue, please give it a score of 99.

“Party Position Distributional Issues “

Cultural indicators:

- “First, can you say what position a party favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, equal opportunities for women, homosexuality or euthanasia (in which case it would score 1) or opposes liberal policies on such issues (in which case it would score 7) or something in between?”
- “Can you say whether parties support policies to promote civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to fight crime and promote law and order (in which case they would score 1) or supports tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even when this means curtailing civil liberties (in which case they would score 7) or something in between?”
- “And what about parties’ positions on migration of people in and out of [country]?”

Electoral success:

- Parties’ popular support in the last election preceding our survey in 2008 and 2013. Coded in percent.

Governing status:

- “1” if a party was in government at the time of our survey; 0 if not.

Continuing parties:

- Parties were included in 2008 and 2013.

Misery index:

- An additive index of the standardized unemployment rates (World Bank and Eurostat 2007; Eurostat and IMF 2012) and GDP/capita (World Bank, in current dollars). We first reversed the polarity of the GDP/Capita index, then standardized both, and combined them in an additive index). Low values indicate low misery.

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
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
Figure 1: Parties' Integration Stances and Their Evaluations of the EU's Democracy are closely linked at both time points in Western Europe:




Note: the table presents the bivariate correlation coefficients between the three variables for all parties at each time point (N=114 parties for 2008; N=108 parties for 2013).

	Political Integration		Market Integration	
	2008	2013	2008	2013
Political Integration	1			
Market Integration	.76	.77	1	
EU Democracy	.82	.72	.82	.80

Figure 2: Most parties included in 2008 and 2013 (N=90) did not change their integration stances by more than 1 unit:
 Pearson's $r = .91$:




Pearson's $r = .89$




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Pearson's $r = .87$



Note: Entries are the party positions of parties that were included at both time points (N=90).


Figures 3a and 3b: There is some change in political, market integration, as well as the EU's performance evaluations across party systems (figures include all parties from each time point):



Note: the beginning of each line is the mean scores of an EU evaluation of all parties included in the 2008 surveys; and the end points are defined by the mean scores of all parties in the 2013 surveys. A declining slope (from left to right) indicates a drop in support for an aspect.



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Figure 3b:




Note: Change scores represent the mean of all parties in 2013 minus the mean scores of all parties in 2008. A negative sign indicates that a party system has become more negative on a dimension. This uses the same information as in figure 3a, now highlighting the degree of change.


Figure 4: The relationships between economic left-right positions and predicted EU support show the tepid support of the economic left for integration in 2008 and 2013 (vertical bars denote one standard deviation below and above the mean)...



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


...while the relationship between social issues and integration stances shows that the socio-cultural right is less supportive of integration:



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Predict Market Integration (by cultural liberal-conservative) 2008 and 2013



Predict EU Regime Evaluations (by cultural liberal-conservative) 2008 and 2013






Figure 5: By 2013, Economic Conditions Lower EU Support in Nations with Economic Problems (predicted integration stances of parties based on the multi-level model discussed in the text): Political Unity:



Market Integration:



EU Performance Evaluations:




Table 1: Most variance in integration measures occurs across parties and countries, not over time

	Political integration	Market Integration	EU Regime
Residual level 1 variance (change 2008-2013)	.22	.24	.22
Party-level variance	1.1	.96	.75
Country-level variance	1.1	.96	.75

Entries are variances of each integration measure in an empty multi-level model (xtmixed, Stata 13). Level 1 constitutes change within parties over time, level 2 captures variation across parties; level 3 gauges variation across countries. Analyses are based on 222 observations (114 from wave 1; and 108 from wave 2) in 14 West European countries; mle estimation using Newton-Raphson algorithm was used. For market integration, iterations was set to N=40 to achieve convergence.

Table 2: The main effects of party-level predictors on Integration Stances, 2008-2013

VARIABLES	2008 Political Integration	2013 Political Integration	2008 Market Integration	2013 Market Integration	2008 EU Regime	2013 EU Regime
Salience Political/Market Integration	-0.20* (0.118)	-0.01 (0.122)	0.09 (0.107)	0.01 (0.106)		
Domestic Re-distribution	0.84*** (0.165)	0.86*** (0.186)	0.74*** (0.129)	0.68*** (0.156)	0.49*** (0.143)	0.60*** (0.169)
Domestic Re-distribution squared	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.03*** (0.008)	-0.02*** (0.006)	-0.02*** (0.007)	-0.02** (0.007)	-0.02*** (0.007)
Cultural issues	-0.07 (0.125)	-0.06 (0.128)	0.12 (0.097)	0.25** (0.106)	0.26** (0.108)	0.35*** (0.115)
Cultural Issues squared	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.005)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.01*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.005)
Extreme Parties	-0.72** (0.342)	-1.69*** (0.374)	-0.53** (0.262)	-1.43*** (0.307)	-1.02*** (0.293)	-1.50*** (0.330)
Stable Parties	0.34 (0.275)	0.12 (0.311)	0.16 (0.211)	0.36 (0.259)	0.08 (0.230)	0.15 (0.279)
Electoral success (in percent)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.01 (0.010)	0.03*** (0.007)	0.01 (0.009)	0.02*** (0.008)	0.01 (0.009)
Governing party	0.32 (0.217)	0.49** (0.241)	0.10 (0.168)	0.53** (0.203)	0.30 (0.187)	0.67*** (0.219)
Constant	1.36 (1.359)	0.58 (1.349)	-1.96* (1.053)	-1.45 (1.118)	-1.20 (1.048)	-1.89* (1.128)
Observations	114	108	114	108	114	108
R-squared	0.753	0.728	0.835	0.777	0.720	0.690

Note: Entries are OLS unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country fixed effects are included but not shown for reasons of space. Variables are coded so that a position sign indicates more support for political and market integration and positive EU evaluations for: greater salience, market-based economic stances, left parties, stable parties, greater electoral success, and governing parties. Reference group for stable parties are “exit” parties in 2008; and “new” parties in 2013.