

**UNCOMMITTED EUROPEANS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
DYNAMIC IMPLICATIONS**

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CONCEPTUALIZING EU INTEGRATION

STATIC concept: Support for the EU


BUT

EU IS DYNAMIC

- *Integration by stealth, spillover with passive public acceptance
- *Major events: Eurozone policies promoting more integration
- *Measures adopted to deal with eurozone crisis requires public consent

MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARD AN EVER CLOSER UNION

Q. Some say *European integration should be pushed further*. Others say *it has already gone too far*. What is your opinion?




*21 countries: Median citizen **satisfied as is**; 5s a plurality

*4 countries: Majority for **more** integration

*2 countries: Majority for **less** integration

CLASSIFYING EU OPINIONS



In following slides we group individuals spatially

POTENTIAL INFLUENCES ON ATTITUDES TO INTEGRATION

1. **ENGAGEMENT** in national and EU politics: e.g. interest, EU identity
2. **PERFORMANCE** of national, EU institutions
3. **SOCIO-ECONOMIC** e.g. age, education
4. **CONTEXT**, e.g. Old EU, MEPs pro EU, Economy contracts

DIFFERENT HYPOTHESES FOR DIFFERENT DIVISIONS

PROs vs. ANTIs differ by:

1. Performance of institutions—national and EU
2. Engagement with EU
3. Context

DON'T KNOWS vs. SATISFIED AS IS

1. Not much difference: Nominal distinction without a difference
2. Differ by socio-economic resources
3. Differ by political engagement

PROs compared to ANTIs: MLM Logit Analysis

Avg. marginal effect on PROs (significant at .000)

2. PERFORMANCE

Satisfied with EU	.19
Immigration gone too far	-.07

1. ENGAGEMENT

Feels European	.10
EU impact	.01

4. CONTEXT (significant at .10)

Original EU 6	-.07
New EU 12	.09
More corrupt	.03

3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC resources NOT SIGNIFICANT except

Standard of living	.03
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Wald chi 2	2618
Log likelihood	-8360
McKelvey & Zavoina R2	30%

Source: EES 2009. Number of respondents 15,542.

DON'T KNOWS vs. SATISFIED AS IS: MLM Logit Analysis

Avg marginal effect on DON'T KNOW (sig. at .000)

3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Age	.02
Education	-.04
Standard of living	-.02
Female	.03

2. ENGAGEMENT

Interest in politics	-.03
No left/right self-placement	.06
Knows EU membership	-.04
Feels European	-.04

3. PERFORMANCE

Satisfied with EU	-.03
Dissatisfied national govt.	-.02

4. CONTEXT (significant at .10)

New EU 12	.07
More corrupt govt.	.04

Wald chi 2	1124
Log likelihood	-4270
McKelvey & Zavoina R2	41%

Source: EES 2009. Number of respondents 11,527.

PROs COMPARED TO DK, SATISFIED and ANTI:
MLM Polynomial Logit

	Anti	As Is	Don't Know
(Avg marginal effect significant at .000)			
1. ENGAGEMENT			
Interest in politics	-	-.22	-.49
Neither left/right	-	.20	.82
Knows EU members	.18 !	-	-.22
Feels European	-.40	-.19	-.53
2. PERFORMANCE			
Dissatisfied nat'l govt	.14	-	-
Immigration gone too far	.34	.10	.07
EU impact	-.04	-.03	-
EU satisfaction	-.80	-.34	-.68
3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESOURCES			
Age	-	-	.13
Education	-	-	-.42
Standard of living	-.18	-.12	-.32
Female	-	.25	.49
Parents born in country	-.20	-	-
4. CONTEXT			
Old EU 6	.27	.20	-
New EU 12	-.35	-	.57
MEPs pro-integration	-.004	-.005	-
Economy contracted	-.05	-.02	-
More corrupt govt.	-.13	-.16	.20
Wald chi 2		8362	
Log likelihood		-30750	
McKelvey & Zavoina R2		12%	

Source: EES 2009 Survey. Number of respondents: 27,069; pro=reference category;

A 1.5-ORDER EP ELECTION AS 1st and 2nd ORDER MERGE

*Eurozone crisis and EU response makes EU much more salient in national politics

.Association of EU policies with austerity is negative

*Free movement of people across national borders associates EU with immigration perceived as creating competition for national jobs.

*Many attitudinal influences e.g. socio-economic and context, relatively static BUT:

Reduced EU satisfaction can move pro-integration to As Is or Don't Know,

More dissatisfaction national govt (not national economy) can boost Antis.

More salience of immigrant would reduce Pros.

A MULTI-LEVEL OUTCOME

*At EU level a cartel:

Three largest EP Party Groups—EPP, Socialists, ALDE—all favour more integration

Growth and Stability Pact authorizes Commission to increase integration

BUT

*At national level no cartel exists.

National parties can compete on 1.0, 1.5 as well as 2.0 issues.

Growth in vote for anti-parties can affect national governments in Council

Any Treaty to confirm an ever closer Union would require referendums

in UK, Ireland, Denmark and ????

APPENDIX TABLES

Table A1. DIVISION of EES 2009 ON EU INTEGRATION BY COUNTRY (%)

	anti	satisfied	dk	pro
Romania	12	19	15	54
Spain	14	31	4	51
Poland	10	32	13	46
Slovenia	26	30	2	42
Greece	28	28	3	41
Italy	25	27	8	40
Netherlands	19	40	1	39
Cyprus	30	28	7	36
Germany	27	36	1	36
Denmark	22	43	1	35
Lithuania	16	28	23	33
Sweden	23	43	2	33
Czech Republic	24	35	10	32
France	33	32	4	32
Luxembourg	30	35	2	32
Malta	15	24	30	32
Bulgaria	14	31	24	31
Ireland	20	48	2	31
Slovakia	15	35	18	31
Belgium	25	39	7	29
Hungary	27	31	13	29
Portugal	22	34	17	27
Austria	37	36	2	25
Estonia	32	32	11	25
Finland	32	48	1	19
United Kingdom	41	41	3	16
Latvia	44	27	14	15
<i>Total</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>33</i>

Source: EES 2009 q80; anti: 0-3; as is: 4,5,6; pro: 7-10.

Table A 2. FULL MLM LOGIT OF PROS vs. ANTIS

	Avg. marg. effect	Std. Err.	P
SOCIO-ECONOMIC			
age	-.010	.003	.001
education	-.007	.006	.242
class	-.005	.005	.358
standard of living	.035	.007	.000
female	-.001	.009	.877
parents born country	.010	.014	.491
ENGAGEMENT			
watch TV elect. news	.009	.007	.204
interest in politics	-.002	.010	.845
neither LR	-.017	.010	.095
voted EP election	.006	.011	.619
knows EU members	-.021	.010	.033
feels European	.104	.010	.000
EU impact	.010	.002	.000
PERFORMANCE			
dissatisfied nat'l gov	-.035	.010	.001
dissatisf. nat'l econ	-.005	.005	.304
EU handled MIP	-.006	.011	.574
immigration gone too far	-.071	.004	.000
EU satisfaction	.186	.006	.000
CONTEXT			
original EU6	-.074	.046	.105
new EU12	.095	.050	.057
MEPs pro integration	.001	.001	.266
economic contraction	.013	.005	.008
more corrupt govt	.026	.014	.062
Wald chi2	2618.44		
Log likelihood	-8360.6506		
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	.30		

Source: EES 2009; N=15,542; 1=pro unification; 0=against unification
(0=0-3; 1=7-10 original scale):

Table A3. MLM LOGIT OF DON'T KNOWS vs. SATISFIED AS IS

	Avg. marg. effect	Std. Err.	P
SOCIO-ECONOMIC			
age	.017	.002	.000
education	-.041	.005	.000
class	.006	.003	.085
standard of living	-.020	.004	.000
female	.034	.006	.000
parents born country	-.015	.011	.160
ENGAGEMENT			
watch TV elect. news	-.008	.004	.082
interest in politics	-.031	.007	.000
neither LR	.056	.008	.000
voted EP election	-.011	.007	.105
knows EU members	-.038	.007	.000
feels European	-.041	.007	.000
EU impact	.003	.001	.015
PERFORMANCE			
dissatisfied nat'l govt	-.023	.007	.000
dissatisf. nat'l economy	.002	.003	.512
EU handled MIP	-.020	.007	.002
immigration gone too far	-.010	.003	.001
EU satisfaction	-.034	.004	.000
CONTEXT			
EU6	.007	.027	.783
New EU12	.074	.032	.020
MEPs pro integration	.001	.001	.306
economic contraction	.001	.003	.635
more corrupt govt	.041	.009	.000
Wald chi2	1124.74		
Log likelihood	-4270.531		
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	.41		

Source: EES 2009; N=11,527; 1=ref, dk; 0=as is (0=4-6 original scale);

Table A 4. POLYNOMIAL LOGIT OF GROUPS vs. MORE INTEGRATION

	Anti		Satisfied as is		DK	
	Coef.	P	Coef.	P	Coef.	P
SOCIO-ECONOMIC						
age	.030	.011	-.031	.003	.127	.000
education	-.003	.892	.042	.028	-.417	.000
class	.031	.134	-.014	.459	.039	.184
standard of living	-.181	.000	-.121	.000	-.323	.000
female	.034	.347	.247	.000	.494	.000
parents born ctry	-.196	.000	.059	.231	-.093	.288
ENGAGEMENT						
watch TV news	-.004	.879	.012	.598	-.103	.008
interest in politics	.034	.396	-.217	.000	-.492	.000
neither LR	.081	.034	.204	.000	.820	.000
voted EP election	.024	.573	-.033	.381	-.030	.611
knows EU members	.179	.000	.050	.121	-.224	.000
feels European	-.396	.000	-.188	.000	-.528	.000
EU impact	-.039	.000	-.035	.000	-.005	.679
PERFORMANCE						
dissatisfy. nat'l gov	.145	.000	.032	.337	-.129	.020
dissatisf. nat'l econ	.049	.018	-.037	.035	-.060	.046
EU handled MIP	.065	.109	-.046	.196	-.196	.002
imgr. gone too far	.344	.000	.097	.000	.070	.004
EU satisfaction	-.801	.000	-.345	.000	-.680	.000
CONTEXT						
EU6	.270	.000	.198	.000	.091	.193
New EU12	-.359	.000	-.146	.001	.572	.000
MEPs pro integr.	-.004	.000	-.005	.000	.004	.012
Ec. contraction	-.049	.000	-.022	.000	-.010	.100
more corrupt govt	-.130	.000	-.156	.000	.204	.000
LRchi2		8362				
Log likelihood		-30750				
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2		12%				

Source: EES2009; pro European integration=reference category;

Table A 5. LIST OF VARIABLES

	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
q80 electorate on EU integration	1	4	2.26	0.93
SOCIO-ECONOMIC				
age in deciles	1	6	3.58	1.61
education	1	4	3.01	0.94
class	1	4	2.48	0.98
standard of living	1	3	2.05	0.78
female	0	1	0.56	0.50
parents born ctry	0	1	0.88	0.32
ENGAGEMENT				
watch TV elect. news	0	2	0.96	0.72
interest in politics	0	1	0.53	0.50
neither LR	0	1	0.38	0.49
voted EP election	0	1	0.71	0.46
knows EU members	0	1	0.36	0.48
feels European	0	1	0.57	0.50
EU impact	0	10	5.51	2.12
PERFORMANCE				
Dissatisfied nat'l gov	0	1	0.52	0.50
Dissatisf. nat'l econ	1	4	3.15	0.92
EU handled MIP	0	1	0.26	0.44
Immigr. gone too far	1	5	3.51	1.22
EU satisfaction	0	3	1.54	1.10
CONTEXT				
EU6	0	1	0.22	0.42
New EU12	0	1	0.45	0.50
MEPs pro integration	29	100	83.49	16.91
Economic contraction	-17.70	1.60	-5.75	4.05
More corrupt TI	.70	6.20	3.65	1.76

Sources: European Election Study (www.piredeu.eu). Individual respondents in 27 countries, 27,069. EU impact scale: Mean score on EU responsibility for economic conditions, health care, interest rates, immigration. EU satisfaction scale: Number of positive responses for EU trusted, a good thing and makes decisions in interest of respondent's country. Perception of Corruption index 2009: Transparency International Index inverted so higher score is more corrupt. Transparency International, www.transparency.org.